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In addition to the questions above some purely methodological questions are posed. The experiments themselves involved some experimental techniques that had not been used before. It was necessary to determine whether or not these techniques exerted an independent influence on market behavior before further studies could be conducted.
The theories we call upon can be divided into two broad classes. However, before discussing theories we should note the existence of nontheories asserted in newspapers and social commentaries. These are in effect claims that asset prices are arbitrary. Such prices depend upon the idiosyncratic nature of individual behavior and convey little or no information at all about the states of the world or the magnitude of economic parameters. Some implications of this belief are that there are no reasons to study asset markets because there is nothing to learn and those who claim there is are confusing religion with science. Needless to say, most economists would disagree with this view and tend to dismiss it as "table talk" or "uninformed chatter" which is of no concern. It never appears in academic journals (at least we could find no good quotes). The fact is, however, that the profession has no simple way to disconfirm seemingly outlandish beliefs when held by skeptical students, colleagues in other disciplines, and decisionmaking politicians.
The first class of theories holds that asset prices are not arbitrary. Indeed the prices may exhibit a great deal of regularity. Those who accept theories of this first type would claim that the regularities may have very little, if anything, to do with underlying economics or the economy. Instead asset prices follow laws of random motion such as martingales. The only information that P, conveys might be something about the probability of various prices in the past. The implication of this line of theory is that one might study charts, charting techniques, and various other models of stochastic processes.
Included in this class of theories, would be purely expectational equilibria similar to one put forth by Keynes. The essential idea is captured in the following selection from his General Theory: Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds the prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees (Keynes [10, p.
156]).
While one may argue about what Keynes "really means" one natural conclusion from such a behavioral hypothesis is that for any set of vectors of returns to individuals virtually any price vector can be an equilibrium given the proper set of beliefs. This is possible because each individual bases his valuations, and hence his choices, entirely on the expected valuations of other individuals without stipulating any connection with an underlying stream of returns from holding the asset. In essence, all investors are viewed as short-run speculators who are not concerned with the stream of returns generated directly from holding the asset. Here the informational content of prices is, loosely speaking, a reflection of the "average" trader's expectations of future prices of the asset.
The second set of theories all hold that asset prices exhibit regularities that are systematically related to the underlying returns generated by the asset. All such models stipulate a consistency among expected individual returns, possible capital gains and individual choice behavior, but they differ on how these are related. Individual learning models, for example, have individuals forming expectations about price changes and the asset price being determined by choices based on both those expectations and the individual's expected stream of dividend returns from holding the asset (Easley [2] , Jordan [9] , and Townsend [17] ). The rational expectations hypothesis and the related perfect foresight equilibrium concept stipulate a further direct consistency between expectations and the actual price behavior (see, for example, Harrison and Kreps [8] ). The efficient market hypothesis extends the relationship to the speed with which economic events are translated into market prices by claiming that "prices at any time fully reflect all available information" (Fama [ 
3, p. 383]).
These three categories (one class of nontheories and two classes of theories) are intended only as a means of organizing our thoughts and discussions. Clearly they do not capture the details of the wide variety and complexity of existing models. The formal development of specific models is contained in Section 4.
THE LABORATORY MARKETS
The economic properties of each of the five markets we studied are listed below. It is hoped that the study of such special cases will lead to clearly interpretable results despite the complexities of individual and market behavior that is observed in laboratory environments.
(a) Each market year had two periods, A and B. All period A's (in a market) were identical in terms of the underlying distribution of returns and all period B's in a market were identical. Thus each year was in a sense a replication of previous years.
(b) Each experiment consisted of a fixed group of subjects who participated in a sequence of six to eight market years. Each period A and each period B was seven minutes long.
(c) Assets had a one-year life. The supply of assets was constant for all periods of all years.
(d) Individual monetary returns from assets in any given period of a year were linear in the number of units of the asset held. That is, individual i received returns (dividends) dA for each unit of the asset held at the end of any period A and dB' for each unit of the asset held at the end of any period B.
(e) Individuals were partitioned into trader "types." Individuals of a given trader type had identical returns but the returns differed across types. Five markets were studied using subjects who were undergraduate male and female students at the California Institute of Technology. In three of the markets (Experiments 3, 4, and 5), only subjects who had been in one of the first two experiments were used and thus could be considered experienced.
In Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5 there were nine traders; in Experiment 4 there were eight. At the beginning of a trading year each trader was endowed with two3 "certificates" which had no face value but paid a "dividend" at the end of each of the two periods, A and B, during the year. The value of the dividend depended upon the individual and the period. That is, each certificate held by individual i at the end of a period could yield $X to individual i while each certificate held by individual j could yield $ Y to individual j. Furthermore, a certificate could yield a different amount to a given individual in period A than it yielded to the same individual during period B. Because of these differences, there are gains from exchange with one individual selling the certificate to another.
The difference in individual returns was used only after considerable thought. The importance of the feature for the laboratory market is clear enough-it fosters the existence of gains from exchange. In addition, there are a number of reasons why streams of returns in naturally occurring markets might generally be different for different investors or for the same investor at different times. First of all, the evaluation of services of actual physical assets such as durable consumption goods might be greatest during early periods for some owners, while other owners might place a greater value in later periods. Secondly, for financial assets such as stocks for which the returns are dividends, different owners might be in different tax brackets or different risk classes. With the latter interpretation, (dA, dB) might be considered as a set of "certainty equivalent" dividends, different for each risk class. Third, the investors may all be risk neutral and simply have different expectations over the streams of returns, which in fact are random variables.
The parameters for the five markets are given in and in Experiment 4 each franc was worth $.01. These conversion values may seem small at first but in fact the transaction prices in terms of francs were sufficiently high to make the dollar payoffs and values of decisions comparable to other experiments which have been successfully completed with subjects drawn from these subject pools. The average amount earned by a trader was about $16 for two and one-half hours participation. Table I is read as follows. Consider Experiment 1 where there were three different types of investors with three individuals of each type. Each of the three was given 10,000 francs and two certificates at the beginning of each year. They were then allowed to trade freely according to their wishes subject to wellestablished rules during the year. Each certificate held at the end of period A yielded 300 francs and each held at the end of period B yielded 50 francs. They could also add to their franc holdings by selling certificates either from their endowments or from the ones they had purchased for potentially profitable resale. All francs held in excess of 10,000 francs were translated into dollars at the rate of $.002 per franc and this was the amount of money the individual was allowed to keep. The payoff for all other groups and all other experiments should be interpreted similarly.
As will be discussed below several models can be applied to predict what will evolve from these simple markets. Looking ahead, however, will enable the reader to understand the structure and interrelations among the experiments. The first three experiments can be explained rather well by a perfect foresight equilibrium model (to be described below). The remaining two experiments were then designed to explore some slightly different markets using the insights gained from the first three. Once a positive result has been established it is only natural to initiate an inquiry which seeks deeper reasons about why the model works and if it will continue to work under other parameters, institutions, and complica-tions. Experiment 4 represents an attempt to create a market by simple parameter adjustments which would equilibrate to an inefficient allocation. Experiment 5 involves an institutional perturbation-a futures market. The second break with tradition involves the nonpayment of commissions. It is known that the absence of trading commissions can cause slight divergences from demand and supply predictions (Plott and Smith [13] ). Current theory holds that trading involves a slight cost which is overcome by a commission. Thus the lack of a trading commission can induce some small inaccuracies in models. On the other hand, the existence of a commission, since individuals can be on both sides of the market simultaneously, can lead to an infinite number of trades. The latter possibility was considered to be a greater problem than the former so commissions were omitted.
HYPOTHESES AND SPECIFIC MODELS
Our formal analysis will be concentrated upon models motivated by the second class of theories. If the models fail to work, then we would look to opinions in the first two classes of ideas (the "nontheory" class and the first theory class) for structuring future research priorities. On the other hand, if the models work, then we know the market behavior predicted by the first two views is not pervasive. The next steps would then involve attempts to understand why such models work and isolate the range of circumstances in which they can be relied upon. Perhaps ideas in the first classes are relevant when the situation becomes sufficiently rich but that can only be established by building up results from the simple cases which can (potentially) be thoroughly understood.
A two-period model for a discrete homogeneous asset seems to be the natural one to apply. There are n types of investors, each of whom "knows" his/her stream of returns, ( In other words, convergence in period A "follows" convergence in period B. We call this the "swing-back hypothesis."
In these markets investors enter in year one with no idea (or perhaps only a vague idea in the case of "experienced" investors) of the market price and they learn more about it in each subsequent year. Specifically in year one investors bring only their own private information to the market place. However, the perfect foresight equilibrium implicitly requires agents to possess information which they will normally receive by observing prices. Once prices are observed the lack of information which previously impeded attainment of a perfect foresight equilibrium no longer exists. Due to this, one would expect the trading to begin at the naive equilibrium price and monotonically converge to the perfect foresight equilibrium price as trading publicizes information that originally was private. In the absence of a period B futures market, investors will be unable to incorporate period B price information in their period A decisions until after the first year of trading. Implicit in this observation is Grossman's notion that in such markets replication is a necessary condition for convergence to a perfect foresight equilibrium when only sequential spot trading is allowed. This is the sixth hypothesis and only applies to a sequential market organization in which futures markets are absent. Table I Table II ).
HYPOTHESIS 9N: Certificate holdings are the same as the holdings predicted by the naive expectations model (see Table II ).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our analysis of the data is contained in three categories: price convergence, quantity convergence, and individual behavior. In dealing with the data we face some open problems that are being encountered in almost all experimental work where the cost of conducting experiments places a significant constraint on the number of observations. As will be obvious in the figures, the high degree of serial correlation of prices in a given experiment, both within a period and across periods, suggests the simultaneous interaction of the learning process by individuals and a convergence process by the market. Yet, without a theory about these processes, our statistical statements suffer from an inability to use all the data available to us. Furthermore, the statistical tests we report should be regarded more as measures than classical hypothesis tests. Fortunately, the data from these experiments show sufficient regularities so that this should cause no problems. Table III) . Hypothesis 3, which states that naive expectations provide a lower bound for prices, is almost a direct implication of Hypothesis 4; it is not particularly surprising that all five experiments support Hypothesis 3 for years beyond year two. Simple hypothesis testing allows us to reject the naive expectations Hypothesis 2 at any significance level. Note that Hypotheses 2 and 4 give mutually inconsistent price predictions for these markets and are sufficiently different that the strong support for Hypothesis 4 implies the rejection of Hypothesis 2.
A. Price Convergence
The "swing-back" Hypothesis 5 that period B convergence precedes period A convergence was supported in all experiments. The relevant inequality was satisfied in every year. This reaffirms the crucial importance of price as a carrier of market information.
The experiments support Hypothesis 6, that convergence in experiments 1-4 will be from below beginning at the naive price. In three out of four experiments average price was at or below PA' in year one (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). In two out of four experiments prices were not significantly different from PA' (at the 5 per cent level) even during year two (Experiments 1 and 2) .
Both Hypotheses 7 and 8 pertain to Experiment 5 alone. Hypothesis 7 (that the first six experiments extend to the case of futures markets) can be accepted on the basis of the above discussion with one important caveat. With a period B futures market (Experiment 5) the period A price in year one was much greater than PA . In fact, it was halfway between the naive price and the perfect foresight price. We suggest that this was observed because individuals were able to obtain information about the period B price before making period A transactions. This theory, if ultimately supported, would also explain why Hypothesis 8 was supported. (Hypothesis 8 asserts that period A price will converge more rapidly with a futures market.) The relevant inequality, defined in Hypothesis 8, was satisfied in every case.
Our intuition that the existence of a no-trade equilibrium at naive prices would prevent or impede convergence to the Pareto optimal perfect foresight equilibrium was not supported. In Experiment 4 which was designed to explore this possibility, speculative investment by one investor (who had participated in an earlier experiment) drove the market away from the inefficient price in early years to an efficient, market-clearing (zero excess demand) price by the end of the final year. It appears that this phenomenon permitted the perfect foresight equilibrium to be reached in that experiment.
B. Quantity Convergence and Efficiency
The predictions about quantity convergence and efficiency of the experimental asset markets were very accurate. Predicted quantities (according to Hypothesis 9F) are 100 per cent accurate after the first year in Experiment 5, the second year Per cent of maximum total payout was calculated relative to original endowments. That is, if all participants in the market make no trades and are just paid on the basis of their original endowments only, then according to our measure, the per cent of maximum total payout is 0.0. 100 per cent correct. In Experiment 5 the model is 100 per cent correct after only one period, thus adding support for the hypothesis that the futures market causes more rapid convergence of the spot market.
The efficiency levels in Table V Both the quantity and efficiency data provide strong evidence that these markets began at the naive equilibrium but ultimately converged to a rational expectations equilibrium. Only when a futures market existed (Experiment 5) did the market appear to bypass the naive equilibrium and converge immediately to the more efficient perfect foresight equilibrium.
C. Individual Behavior
In simple markets like these one might think that individual behavior is simple or "mechanical" and that the resulting market behavior is therefore "obvious." There are three observations about individual behavior which seemed particularly interesting in this respect and suggest that individual behavior is complicated. Both types of behavior are difficult to explain. One such observed action we will refer to as "overlapping." That is, investors do not always treat transacted price signals as bounds on willingness to pay. Sufficient information exists in the instructions to deduce that each individual has a dividend structure such that each individual's total dividend earnings are linear in the number of certificates held. Such a return structure suggests that in the absence of speculative purchases each transacted price indicates a lower bound on the buyer's willingness to pay. For example, it is hard to understand why subject one would sell subject two an asset for twenty francs if one just sold an asset to -two for thirty francs in the previous year and one knows that two has a perfectly flat return structure (but doesn't know two's limit price). From the previous transactions individual one has reason to suspect (especially in period B where there is less opportunity to speculate) that he/she could hold out for thirty. In the experiments one observes trades transacted atpi and then observes subsequent trades in the same period and in later periods transacted at P2' where P2 < p,. This frequency of overlapping can be seen in Figures 2-6. A second observation which seems surprising is the lack of willingness of most individuals to attempt to earn short-term capital gains. Because much of the trading was out of equilibrium and an upward trend in period A prices was fairly well established in the early years, intratemporal arbitrage opportunities abounded. Even in period B the typical pattern of prices within a period started low and increased at the end of the period. Yet such arbitrage rarely occurred. This makes us suspicious of theories of the first type which suggest that equilibria are the result of short-term risky speculation.
A third observation is related to learning. We originally had thought that experience might be an important factor since it seemed likely that inexperienced subjects required several market years to become completely comfortable with trading rules, recording methods, etc. For this reason experienced subjects were used in Experiments 3, 4, and 5. Although convergence with experienced subjects seems to occur somewhat faster than with inexperienced subjects, the same general patterns of convergence to equilibrium are present in the data with both sets of subject pools. Thus, even though experienced subjects were used, the necessity for having done this is not at all evident. It is clear that the rational expectations equilibrium (i.e., the perfect foresight equilibrium) model is an excellent predictor of the behavior in these simple markets. The role of replication is also clear in the markets. In particular, for sequential markets such as those studied here without a futures market, replication is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the applicability of the perfect foresight equilibrium model. Necessity is established because the markets do not converge in the first period. Sufficiency is established by convergence of all markets after replication. Of course, exactly how this result extends to more complicated situations remains to be determined.
With these findings the results of Miller, Plott, and Smith [11] and Plott and Uhl [14] can be reinterpreted as having provided some experience with the behavior of asset markets. Units in those experiments can be viewed as assets which yield zero dividend returns to the traders5 and the equilibria can correspondingly be viewed as rational expectations equilibria. Of course the absence of intraperiod trading possibilities (which prevents the intraperiod speculation) and the adjustments on the supply side to aid the equating of market prices over time remove some of the important structural features of asset markets but the application of theory to explain the data is clear. The convergence pattern in these markets is reminiscent of a dynamic programming algorithm. We have called it the "swingback hypothesis." The last period converges first and the convergence works back from this to earlier periods as the years replicate. Thus, information about prices seems to be the critical variable as the theory suggests. This conclusion is reinforced with the addition of a futures market. It is reasonable to conjecture that the transmission of information about future prices speeds the convergence of the period A spot market.
The observed price convergence has a pattern which supports another theoretical interpretation. The appropriate model may have the markets converging to a temporary (naive) equilibrium first and then adjusting to the perfect foresight equilibrium after "sufficient" information has accumulated (Grandmont [5] ). Other experimental evidence suggests that a market has converged to an equilibrium when there is "low variance" of transacted prices around the average. This evidence may be used to support a conjecture that Experiments 1 and 2 converged to the naive equilibrium in year 2, and Experiment 3 converged in year 1 (see Figures 2-4) .
Several new experimental features were introduced in these experiments. The use of special currency seems to cause no problems. And, the truncation of profits seems to leave behavior unperturbed. For example, a comparison of the behavior of these markets with those reported in Smith [16] , which also had rectangular demands and supplies, yields few differences. The lack of a trading commission is thought to prevent "full convergence" (Plott and Smith [13] ) but almost all experiments reported here were within $.03 of predicted perfect foresight equilibrium prices in dollar terms.
There are several general implications which follow from the results above. (a) Any theory which advocates the general absence of regularities related to the underlying economic parameters of asset markets is demonstrably wrong. Thus, those who accept such a position must begin to adopt qualifications. (b) Because these markets never converged to the perfect foresight equilibrium during the first period, a strict rational expectations theory which does not require replication is inconsistent with the data. Similarly, the efficient market hypothesis can be rejected to the extent that it postulates immediate and instantaneous adjustments. Replication necessarily plays an important role in determining the appli51n these experiments traders had the exclusive right to purchase units in period A for resale in period B, but they could not sell units in period A or purchase units in period B.
cability of these models, and theories which address the question of how rational expectations are formed should be given serious consideration. (c) The study of futures market institutions can be supplemented by experimental techniques. Danthine [1] and Grossman [7] suggest that futures markets can play an important role in publicizing the private information which exists in an economy. Our initial probe with a single experiment establishes the feasibility of creating a controlled-environment futures market which has some of the properties they suggest will exist. A comparison of the observations from the first four markets with the fifth leads us to conjecture that the existence of a futures market affects the spot market. A futures market may increase the speed with which information is made public through price transactions. We suspect that this increases the speed of convergence to equilibrium, perhaps removes the necessity of replication, and might increase market efficiency. All of these conjectures were supported in the single futures market we studied. In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates in a sequence of market years. Each year consists of two periods, the first of which will be called A, and the second B. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled information and record sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
University of Iowa
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of francs. Each franc is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION
The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series of years each consisting of two periods. Each period lasts for 7 minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates in a sequence of market years. Each year consists of two periods, the first of which will be called A, and the second B. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled information and record sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series of years each consisting of two periods. Trading for both periods will be done in period A. This period will last minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. When making a bid or offer, you must specify whether you wish to buy or sell a period A or period B certificate. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single certificate, and the contracting parties will record the transaction on their information and record sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptance will be resolved by random choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance, you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can.
The profit sheet for Experiment 5 was the same as that for the other experiments. The information and record sheet for Experiment 5 differed in that the francs-on-hand inventory was carried in a single column on the right-hand side of the form as opposed to the two columns shown on the form above under period A and period B.
